



Institute for Defense Analyses

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Briefing to DoD
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Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment

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Introduction

- **Some lessons learned during Operation Allied Force in 1999 resulted from conducting personnel recovery in a coalition environment.**
- **DPMO commissioned a study for FY2000 to identify PR problems and issues unique to the coalition environment.**
- **IDA provides independent analytical support to DPMO in identifying policy issues that improve a CINC's ability to execute personnel recovery missions in a coalition environment during operations other than war.**
- **IDA seeks to improve the overall effectiveness of personnel recovery missions in operations other than war with coalition partners by identifying and addressing policy issues.**
- **IDA will publish an interim report on Europe and the NATO Alliance in early 2001.**



Study Tasks

- **Assess CSAR-specific interoperability issues between US and coalition partners.**
- **Assess the impact of these problems on Joint US-NATO PR efforts.**
- **Assess the impact of interoperability problems on joint recovery efforts with other allies and the feasibility of conducting joint recovery efforts with non-traditional coalition partners.**
- **Assess the impact on PR efforts of the releasability of classified information to none of or a subset of coalition partners.**
- **Assess the impact of coalition partners' different PR policies on coalition personnel recovery.**
- **Assess the impact of differences between allied PR policies, including ISOPREP systems, SERE training, and recovery operations.**
- **Assess the limitations to integrating US and coalition rescue efforts as a result of policy restrictions and the impact of those limitations on rescue efforts.**



Findings

Assess CSAR-specific interoperability issues between US and coalition partners.

- Level of interoperability is still unknown
 - IDA's initial hypothesis was that interoperability was #1 problem
 - » **Anecdotal evidence from small number of operations and exercises supports this**
 - » **NATO AWACS vs. US CSARTF (OAF)**
 - » **NATO vs. US C4 Systems (Clean Hunter 2000)**
 - Lack of continuing operations and exercises prevents identification of specific interoperability problems
 - DoD must initiate training or T&E program in order to address this issue
 - It is reasonable to extrapolate documented joint interoperability problems to the coalition environment
 - » NVG vs. FLIR (JCSAR JT&E)
 - » UNIX vs. WinNT (ASD/C3I JSRC Study)



Findings

Assess the impact of these problems on Joint US-NATO PR efforts.

- Lack of training and exercises is #1 PR problem in the NATO environment
 - IDA's survey data supports this finding
 - Confusion during OAF CSAR missions was a result of a lack of full-up, integrated CSAR exercises
 - CSAR capability will remain an unknown quantity until training & exercise program is initiated
 - » **Warfighter confidence will remain low**
 - » **#1 indicator of a "credible insurance policy"**
 - Lack of training is preventing DoD from identifying and solving other PR-related problems
 - ***Policy changes that improve training have overwhelming support from the Combatant Commands!***



Findings

Assess the impact of interoperability problems on joint recovery with other allies and the feasibility of conducting joint recovery with non-traditional coalition partners.

- Again, these interoperability problems remain unknown
 - Survey data indicates that problems increase in coalitions with other than traditional allies
 - » **Britain, Canada, Australia**
 - Impact of training and exercise deficiencies will be more severe
 - » **Wider “Training Gap” between US and non-traditional coalition partners**
 - This issue is the focus of the next phase of the study
 - Expand scope of study to remaining geographic theaters
 - » **Pacific Command and Korea**
 - » **Southern Command**
 - » **Central Command**
 - Expand scope of study to non-traditional coalition partners
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Findings

Assess the impact on PR efforts of the releasability of classified info to none of or a subset of coalition partners.

- Impact on releasability of classified information to coalition partners is ***Significant!***
 - #2 problem overall on IDA's survey of PR community
 - Major issue in OAF After-Action Report to Congress
- This issue highlights a theme in coalition interoperability:
 - ***“Our coalition interoperability problems mirror our joint and inter-agency interoperability problems.”***
 - » ***Solve Joint problems within US PR community first***
 - » ***Establish perception with coalition that US “has its own house in order”***
 - » ***Provide a roadmap to coalition interoperability***
- This issue goes beyond the PR community
 - Releasability impacts every consumer of intelligence products
 - Purview of ASD/C3I and DIA



Findings

Assess the impact of coalition partners' different PR policies on coalition personnel recovery.

- Differences in other countries' PR policy is ***Negligible!***
 - Ideological differences are relatively insignificant
 - » Other countries do not share America's "cultural imperative"
 - » Coalition partners will hold US to a higher standard
- However, limited resources severely impact other countries' ability to implement policy
 - Coalition partners have limited PR capability
 - Coalition partners have no combat recovery capability
- Therefore, fielding a true "coalition personnel recovery" capability (e.g. combined CSARTF) is not possible



Findings

Assess the impact of differences between allied PR policies, including ISOPREP systems, SERE training, and recovery operations.

- Status of NATO PR policy implementation
 - Recovery Forces
 - » **Most countries training to NATO ATP 62 doctrine and TTP**
 - NATO ATP 62 derived from US and British doctrine
 - » **Some countries have acquisition programs for CSAR helicopters, but are un-funded or under-funded**
 - Command & Control Elements
 - » **Training of NATO C2 elements is well-standardized**
 - SOCEUR espouses Joint coalition operations at the JSOTF level
 - Robust NATO CPX program, OAF is on-going
 - » **NATO countries lack common C4 equipment**
 - Stems from DoD acquisition problems
 - High-risk-of-capture personnel
 - » **All countries training to US doctrine or NATO ATP 62 doctrine**
 - » **Standardization in survival gear, but diversity in survival radios**
 - Limited covert signaling devices



Findings

Assess the limitations to integrating US and coalition rescue efforts as a result of policy restrictions and the impact of those limitations on rescue efforts.

- Current DoD PR Policy does limit US rescue efforts in a coalition environment
 - Policy does not identify authority to direct recovery efforts for isolated allied or coalition personnel
 - Policy is not aligned with NATO “Framework Nation” Policy
 - Policy is not aligned with expectations of our coalition partners
 - Policy prevents DoD from programming or planning to recover isolated allied or coalition personnel
 - Policy of case-by-case approval results in high-risk “ad-hoc” rescue missions



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Questions?

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